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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE ST ATE O·F UTAH
BRASWELL MOTOR FREIGHT
LINES, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vsBANK OF SALT LAKE, a
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12784

BRIEF OF RESP·O,NDENT
NATIJRE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff and Appellant Braswell Motor Freight
Lines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Braswell, initiated this action against Defendant and Respondent Bank of Salt Lake,
hereinafter referred to as Bank, seeking to recover the sum of
$574,031.32 which was deposited in an account at the Bank
together with $1,000,000.00 in additional damages.
The account at the Bank was opened by one William M.
Kendall who had no connection whatever with Braswell.
In its complaint Braswell alleges that the account belonged to
it and that the Bank is liable for withdrawals from the same
which were made by Kendall.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Motions for Summary Judgment were made by the Bank
and Braswell and were both heard by the Court on December
13, 1971.
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Bank
was made for the following reasons:
". . . that there are no legitimate issues of fact
and that plaintiff's claim is barred by the following
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended: Sections 22-1-1, 22-1-9 and 70A-3-405, and the
holding of Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Zions
First National Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 809."
(R. 93).
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Braswell
was directed to the issue of liability on the grounds that:
". . . the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories
and answers thereto show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact, and that the plaintiff, Braswell
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., is entitled as a matter of
law to a judgment in its favor on the issue of liability."
(R. 98).
The Motion for Summary Judgment of the Bank was
granted and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Braswell
was denied by the District Court. ( R. 101, 10 2 ) .
Thereafter a Motion was made by Braswell to modify the
Summary Judgment by imposing a constructive trust in its
favor on the sum of $24,523.90 remaining in the account at
the Bank. (R. 103, 105). This Motion was not resisted by
the Bank for the reasons that Braswell had shown that the
funds in the account at the Bank had been embezzled from it
2

and that a constructive trust should be imposed upon the same
for the benefit of Braswell. An Amended Judgment was entered awarding Braswell the remaining balance in the account
at the Bank in the sum of $24,523.90 (R. 106, 107) and this
amount has been paid by the Bank to Braswell. (The Satisfaction of Judgment was not included in the record on appeal.)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Bank seeks to have the ruling of the District Court
in granting its Motion for Summary Judgment and in denying
the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Braswell affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 7th day of July, 1969 a person representing himself to be William M. Kendall opened an account at
the Bank in the name of "Braswell Motor Freight Lines"
and completed an account card showing William M.
Kendall as the authorized signatory on the account. (R. 32
& 41).
Braswell disclaims any connection with William M. Kendall whatever. (R. 86 and deposition of J. V. Braswell, p.
26). Mr. Kendall represented to Joann Sullivan, the new accounts secretary of the Bank, at the time the account was
opened that he was acting as an agent for Braswell Motor
Freight Lines negotiating for the purchase of a dormant trucking authority in the State of Utah. (R. 32). He signed the
account card in the name of "Braswell Motor Freight Lines"
by designating "William M. Kendall, President," ( R. 41) .
Braswell is a Texas corporation and is not now or has it ever
been engaged in business in the State of Utah nor has it ever
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done business with the Bank. (Deposition of ]. V. Braswell,
p. 55). This is si,jnificant as the address given by Mr. Kendall
for the account- in the name of "Braswell Motor Freight lines"
was "P.O. Box 613r, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105." (R. 41).
At all times relevant to these proceedings Braswell employed in its accounting department one D. M. Wertz, as assistant comptroller. (R. 85 and deposition of J. V. Braswell,
p. 22). One of the functions of Wertz as assistant comptroller
for Braswell was to order checks to be drawn on the account
of Braswell with the Oakcliff Bank and Trust Company,
Dallas, Texas to be deposited in another account maintained
by Braswell for the purpose of paying employees. From June
of 1969 through August of 1970 five ( 5) such orders for
checks were prepared by Wertz and approved by his superior
C. R. Craig totaling the sum of $573,981.32. The checks
were made payable to "Braswell Motor Freight Lines" and
were deposited in the account in the name of "Braswell Motor
Freight Lines" at the Bank by William M. Kendall and bore
the stamped endorsement "For deposit only, Braswell Motor
Freight Lines." (R. 76-78).
Subsequent to the opening of the account at the Bank,
various checks were written and withdrawals made from the
same by William M. Kendall which were presumably misappropriated by him and W. D. Wertz, leaving a balance remaining in the account in the sum of $24,523.90. (R. 28,

29&35).
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The foregoing was as a result of an embezzlement scheme
by William M. Kendall and W. D. Wertz wherein they were
successful in embezzling approximately $800,000.00 from
Braswell from the time Wertz was employed by them in March
of 1969 through September of 1970. (Deposition of ]. V.
Braswell, p. 43). The embezzlement would no doubt have
continued if the employees of the Bank had not undertaken to
locate the corporate offices of Braswell in Dallas, Texas and
ascertain from them their interest in the account at the Bank
an<l the connection of William M. Kendall with them. (R. 34,
deposition of ]. V. Braswell, p. 30).
It is significant to note that D. M. Wertz was hired
as the assistant comptroller of Braswell in March of 1970 in
which position he dealt directly with the management of the
funds of the company, however, he was not bonded. (Deposition of ]. V. Braswell, p. 22). Nor was an investigation conducted of his background which would have shown that he had
been convicted of a felony and discharged from a prior employment because of an embezzlement. (Deposition of J. V.
Braswell, p. 23). Also, despite the recommendations of the
certified public accounting firm auditing the books of Braswell prior to the time of the embezzlement that better internal
controls for the corporation be instituted, these recommendations were apparently not followed. (Deposition of J. V. Braswell, p. 15 & 45, 46). It was also the recommendation of the
accountants that an examination of the cancelled checks be
made which also was apparently not followed. (Deposition of
]. V. Braswell, p. 75). Mr. J. V. Braswell, the President of the
corporation, in his deposition also concedes that if someone in
the company organization had been following the practice of
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reconciling the general account at the Oakcliff Bank and Trust
Company, they would have found that the checks drawn by W.
H. Wertz payable to the order of "Braswell Motor Freight
Lines" did not reach the other company account. (Deposition
of J. V. Braswell, p. 80).
After learning of the embezzlement, Braswell hired Burns
Detective Agency to investigate the same and in fact obtained
sworn statements from W. H. Wertz and William M. Kendall but did not institute proceedings against them to recover
the sums embezzled or any property purchased with the same.
(Deposition of ]. V. Braswell, p. 34). Also no report of the
embezzlement was made to any authorities for the purpose of
criminal prosecution of the embezzlers until October or November, 1971 which is more than one year after the crime had
been discovered. (Deposition of J. V. Braswell, p. 38) .
The actions of Braswell in conducting its affairs 1s
typified by the fact that its president, J. V. Braswell, did not
know of several forgeries on its account at the Texas Bank
and Trust Company, Dallas, Texas in February and March
of 1970 until they were pointed out to him at the time of his
deposition on November 19, 1971. (Deposition of ]. V.
Braswell, p. 76, 77).
In addition to the instant action against the Bank, Bras-

well has filed suit against its former accounting firm, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell and Company, in Dallas, Texas for the sum
of $1,765,025.93 because of its alleged failure to discover
the loss and/or report the same to Braswell. This suit involves
the same funds involved in the instant action. (Deposition of
J. V. Braswell, p. 40).
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BANK
AND BRASWELL OF BANKER AND DEPOSITOR WAS NEVER ESTABLISHED.
In paragraphs three ( 3) and four ( 4) of its Complaint,

Braswell alleges that the relationship was created between
Bras we l1 and the Bank of depositor and banker and that the
Pank is charged with the responsibility of the non-negligent
of its account. (R. 1-3).
The fcregcing allegations fly squarely in the face of the
denial by the officers of Braswell under oath that William M.
Kendall had any connections with Braswell whatever. (R. 86,
deposition of ]. V. Braswell, p. 26).
It is an elementary principle of law that a corporation,
which is a legal entity, can only become bound by the acts of
its agent having the authority to act. In this regard 19 Am.
]ur. 2d, Corporations, Section 1079, provides as follows:
"All corporations must, from necessity, act and
contract through the aid and by means of individuals.
Such individuals may be those holding corporate
off ices or agents properly appointed by such officers;
and as a general rule corporations have the power to
appoint agents with full authority to do acts or enter
into contracts within the power of the corporation. It
is said that validity and animation of the corporate
principle is animated only through its officers and
agents."
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The relationship claimed by Braswell with the Bank is
the relationship of depositor and banker which clearly is a
contractual relationship. If William M. Kendall had no authority to act on behalf of Braswell, any purported contract between Braswell and the Bank made by him is of no force and
effect and the acount in the name of "Braswell Motor Freight
Lines" opened at the Bank is the account of Kendall and not
the account of Braswell. The relationship between a bank and
its customers is set forth in 10 Am. fur. 2d Banks, Section 338
as follows:
" ... In other words, to create the relation of
banker and depositor there must be some contract relation between the proposed depositor and the bank.

* * *

Although money on deposit in a bank is commonly considered to be the property of the depositor,
the relationship in fact between him and the bank is
that of debtor and creditor; the amount on deposit
represents merely an indebtedness by the bank to the
deposition. . . ."
See also Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9
Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944 wherein the relationship between
a bank and a depositor is determined to be contractual in nature.
Unless Braswell will concede that William M. Kendall
who opened the account at the Bank was its agent, it cannot
claim that the contractual relationship between the Bank and
Braswell of banker and depositor was ever created. It is without question that the funds which were deposited in the account in the name of "Braswell Motor Freight Lines" were
embezzled from Braswell by its employee W. H. Wertz and his
accomplice William M. Kendall. Based upon this set of facts
the only claim of Braswell against the Bank is for the imPo-
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sition of a constructive trust on the remaining funds in the
account. In this regard see Corporation of Pres. of Ch. of Jesus
Christ v. Jolley, 24 Utah 2d 187, 467 P.2d 984.
POINT

II

IF WILLIAM M. KENDALL HAD AUTHORITY OF BRASWELL TO ENTER INTO THE
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
BANK OF DEPOSITOR AND BANKER, ITS
CLAIM AGAINST THE BANK IS BARRED BY
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM FIDUCIARIES ACT.
As set forth in Point I, in order for the contractual relationship between Braswell and the Bank of depositor and
banker to be created, William M. Kendall must have been an
agent of Braswell with the authority to open the account for
them with the Bank.
The State of Utah, along with several other states, has
adopted the Uniform Fiduciary Act which is designed to eliminate liability on the part of a bank who deals with a fidicuiary
on behalf of his principal unless the bank knows that the
fiduciary is breaching his duty or acts in bad faith. If William
M. Kendall was an agent of Braswell he would be a fiduciary
which is defined by Section 22-1-2, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as an "agent, officer of a corporation."
The liability of a bank in dealing with an agent or other
fiduciary is set forth in Section 22-1-9, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as follows:
"Deposits in fiduciary's personal account - If a
fiduciary makes a deposit in a bank to his personal
credit of checks drawn by him upon an account in his
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own name as fiduciary, or of checks payable to him as
fiduciary, or of checks drawn by him upon an account
in the name of his principal, if he is empowered to
draw checks thereon, or of checks payable to his principal and endorsed by him, if he is empowered to endorse such checks, or if he otherwise makes a deposit
of funds held by him as fiduciary, the bank receiving
such deposit is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his obligation
as fiduciary; and the bank is authorized to pay the
amount of the deposit or any part thereof upon the personal check of the fiduciary without being liable to the
principal, unless the bank receives the deposit or pavs
the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is
committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in
making mch deposit or in drawing such check, or with
knowledge of such facts that its action in receiving the
deposit or paying the check amounts to bad faith."
{Emphasis added.}
The provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act were construed in the case of Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Zions First
National Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869. In the Sugarhouse case a Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant
Zions First National Bank was reversed as to one cause of
action of the Complaint which alleged that Zions knew that
the fiduciary was committing a breach of his fiduciary obligation. However, in affirming the Summary Judgment as to the
balance of plaintiff's Complaint, the Court, in commenting on
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act states as follows:

". . . In other words, the statute places a duty
upon principal to use only
fiduciaries, and gives
relief to those who deal with fiduciaries except where
they know the fiduciary is breaching his duty to his
principal or where they have knowledge of such facts
that their action in dealing with the fiduciary amounts
to bad faith.

* * *
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The statute was intended to cover just such situations. If a principal cannot trust his agent with money,
he ought to put the agent under bond."
It is significant to note that the Plaintiff's Complaint

fails to allege that the Bank acted in "bad faith" in dealing
with the account in question assuming that it was the account
of Braswell. In setting forth the principle that allegations
of negligence, no matter how many or varied, are not sufficient to amount to bad faith, the Court in the Sugarhouse Finance Company case stated as follows:
"The statute does not define 'bad faith'. However, it defines 'good faith' as being done honestly,
whether it is done negligently or not. 1Bad faith' is
the antithesis of 1good faith' and has been defined in
the cases to be when a thing is done dishonestly and
not merely negligently. Davis v. Pennslyvania Co., etc.,
337 Pa. 456, 12 A.2d 66 ( 1940). It is also defined as
that which imports a dishonest purpose and implies
wrongdoing or some motive of self-interest. National
Casualty Co. v. Caswell & Co., 317 Ill. App. 66, 45
N.E. 2d 698 (1943) ." {Emphasis added}.
Also, since both Braswell and the Bank made Motions
for Summary Judgment simultaneously, all factual matters are
<lcemed to be before the Court. In this case the record is completely void of any facts which would give rise to any claim
that the Bank knew Kendall was breaching a fiduciary obligation or had acted "dishonestly" in connection with its dealings
with the account in question.
In the Brief filed by Braswell, several cases are cited
wherein a depository bank was held liable for unauthorized
withdrawals made by an agent of the corporate depositor including American Lumber Sales Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 127
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Me. 32, 141 A. 102 (1928); Nationwide Homes v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 267 N. C. 528, 148 S.E. 2d 693
( 1966); Barclay Kitchen, Inc. v. California Bank, 25 Cal. Rptr.
383 (Cal. D.C. of App., 1962) and Pacific Indemnity Co. v.
Security First National Bank, 56 Cal. Rptr. 142 (Cal. Ct. of
App. 1967). In each of these cases the account with the depository bank either existed or was opened by an agent of the
depositor as opfX>sed to the fact situation in the instant case
where the account in question was opened by William M. Kendall who had no connection whatever with Braswell. Also, the
cases are not germane here as they were decided in jurisdictions
where the Uniform Fiduciaries Act had not yet been adopted
as liability would not have attached to the depository bank
because of its dealings with a dishonest agent of the corporate
defX>sitor.
POINT

III

NO LIABILITY WOULD ATTACH TO TIIE
BANK BECAUSE OF THE DEPOSIT BY IT OF
THE CHECKS DRAWN ON THE ACCOUNT
OF BRASWELL AT THE OAKCLIFF BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY WHICH WERE DEPOSITED IN THE ACCOUNT AT THE BANK.
Section 70A-3-405, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, appears
to preclude Braswell from asserting any claim against the Bank
for the defX>sit of the checks drawn upon the account of Bras·
well at the Oakcliff Bank and Trust Company and provides in
part as follows:
"Imposters - Signature in name of payee ( 1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a
named payee is effective if
12

(a)
(b)

( c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the name of the payee mtending the latter to have no such interest. . . ."
As was noted in the foregoing Statement of Facts, W. D.
Wertz, the assistant comptroller of Braswell, supplied the
name of the payee on the checks as "Braswell Motor Freight
Lines". Mr. Wertz obviously intended that the plaintiff Braswell should not have any interest in the check which was deposited in the account at the Bank in the name of "Braswell
Motor Freight Lines" as part of the embezzlement scheme in
which he was engaged with his accomplice William M. Kendall. This is further borne out by the fact that the account
opened by William M. Kendall at the Bank bore only his
name as an authorized signatory and listed the address of "Braswell Motor Freight Lines" as P.O. Box 6138, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84105. (R. 41).
A history, analysis and rationale of the "fictitious payee"
rule is succinctly set forth in The Law of Bank Checks, 4th Ed.
Henry]. Bailey (1969) in Section 1524 at p. 523 as follows:
"The 'fictitious payee' rule; Where agent of
drawer supplies name of payee intended to have no
interest in checks. - It is clear that, under the Negotiable Instruments Law, where a check is payable to a
fictitious or non-existing person and that fact is known
to the person who signed the check, the check is deemed to be payable to bearer. Thus, an endorsement in
the name of the payee is not regarded as a forgery, and
the loss arising from the payment of the check must
fall on the drawer who employed the dishonest signing agent.
:JI:
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:JI:

:JI:

The Uniform Commercial Code continues the
expanded 'fictitious payee' rule but does so in a somewhat different manner. The Code provides that, if
an agent or employee supplies the drawer with the
name of the payee but intends the payee to have no
interest in the check, an endorsement by anyone in the
payee's name will be effective . . . cases applying the
expanded 'fictitious payee' rule virtually always involve endorsement in the name of the named payee
by the embezzler or his confederate, rather than an
attempt by the embezzler to circulate bearer paper
without endorsement.
The Code, like the amended N.l.L. provision,
takes the position that the loss in 'padded payroll',
fraudulent invoice and other cases where a dishonest
employee furnishes the signing officer with the name
of the payee (who is to have no interest in the check)
should fall upon the employer as a risk of his business
rather than on the banking system. It is reasoned that
the employer is in a better position to prevent such
acts of dishonesty or to obtain forgery insurance and
that the cost of such insurance is a proper business
expense of the employer. The Code provision would
cover both cases where the payee is fictitious and caseJ
where there is an actual person named as payee but
where the dishonest employee intends the payee to have
no interest in the check." {Emphasis added}.

As can be seen by the foregoing, even assuming that the
payee on the checks, "Braswell Motor Freight Lines", was a
pseudonym for Braswell, no liability would attach to the Bank
for depositing the checks in the account in question or by accepting the endorsement on the check placed there by W. H.
Wertz or William M. Kendall because of the obvious fact
that by their embezzlement scheme they did not intend that
Braswell have any interest in the check.

14

POINT

IV

BRASWELL IS GUIL1Y OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In its Brief Braswell assumes incorrectly that the account
at the Bank was in fact its account and cites certain actions on
the part of the Bank which it claims constituted negligent
mismanagement of the account. Even if the account were
Braswell's it is clear that the actions of Braswell in the management of its funds constitutes contributory negligence on its
part and would preclude any recovery by it from the Bank in
any event.
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, Braswell failed
to follow the recommendations of its accountants on at least
two occasions to implement better internal controls as they
related to the management of company funds. Also, Braswell,
in its Brief, focuses on the transactions surrounding the account at the Bank, however, it omits any reference to the fact
that no investigation was made of its assistant comptroller
W. H. Wertz at the time he was employed and that such an
investigation would have disclosed that he had been convicted
of a felony and dismissed from a prior employment because
of an embezzlement.
Also it is significant to note that Braswell only became
aware of the embezzlement by Wertz and Kendall which
approximated some $800,000.00 when the Bank inquired of
them concerning their interest in the account in question and
their relationship, if any, with William M. Kendall.
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The embezzlement by Wertz and Kendall could have
been prevented or at least detected at any early stage had the
employees of Braswell performed the elementary bookkeeping
task of reconciling its general account at the Oakcliff Bank
and Trust Company, with its special payroll account at that
Bank. This proposition was acknowledged by Mr. J. V. Braswell in his deposition and his testimony is as follows:

"Q.

Mr. Braswell, if somebody had been reconciling
the general account and following the checks to
the deposit slips in the other account, they would
have found these checks didn't reach the other
account, wouldn't they?

A.

They should have, yes."

The position that Braswell is precluded from asserting
any claim against the Bank based upon the checks drawn on
its account at the Oakcliff Bank and Trust Company or withdrawals from the account opened by William M. Kendall at
the Bank is supported by the provisions of Sections 70A-3-406,
Utah Code Annotated, 195 3, which provides as follows:
"Negligence contributing to alteration or unauthorized signature. - Any person who by his negligence
substantially contributes to a material alteration of the
instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signa·
ture is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack
of authority against a holder in due course or against
a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in
good faith and in accordance with the reasonable com·
mercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business."
In the instant case the actions of Braswell in failing to
augment its internal controls allowed checks to be drawn payable to the order of "Braswell Motor Freight Lines" by W. H.
Wertz and it may not now complain that the checks were deposited in an account over which it maintained no control.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing it is apparent that the account in the name of "Braswell Motor Freight Lines" opened
by William M. Kendall was not the account of Braswell. If
the account in question was the account of Braswell it is precluded from asserting a claim against the Bank because of the
provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.
The actions of Braswell's employee, W. H. Wertz, in
supplying the name of "Braswell Motor Freight Lines" as the
payee on the checks drawn on the account at the Oakcliff Bank
and Trust Company with the intent that the payee have no
interest in the same causes the loss to fall upon Braswell who
employed a dishonest employee rather than upon the bank
in accordance with the "fictitious payee" rule as codified
in the Uniform Commercial Code. Additionally, the actions
of Braswell in employing W. H. Wertz and in otherwise managing its financial affairs constitutes contributory negligence
on its part.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
Carman E. Kipp
J. Anthony Eyre
Attorneys for Respondent
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